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The labor arbitration process derives its role from the
unique system of collective bargaining that has evolved in the
United States since the turn of the century. While as others
have noted,l the origins of labor arbitration can be traced
back at least as far as the Anthracite Coal Commission of 1903
and the report of the Industrial Relations Commission of 1902,
it was the choice of collective bargaining as the cornerstone of
our national labor policy in 1935, the subsequent growth of
union membership, and the endorsement of grievance arbitration
by the War Labor Board that insured grievance arbitration a
central role in the American industrial relations system.
Indeed, it was the particular form of collective bargaining that
evolved in the United States in the post 1930s that gave
arbitration a more prominent and vital role in the U.S.
collective bargaining system than in other countries.
To understand the future of arbitration, therefore, we need
to explore two aspects of the future of collective bargaining.
First, how widespread will collective bargaining be? That is,
will the long period of decline in the percentage of the
workforce that is unionized continue and, more importantly, will
the more recent decline in the absolute number of workers
covered by collective bargaining continue?2 Second, will the
changes in the nature of collective bargaining that have been
occuring in the first half of the 1980s alter the future role
and prominence of grievance arbitration?
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It is these aspects of collective bargaining that will be
the central focus of my remarks. Though I will, at the
conclusion, also trace specific implications for grievance
arbitration, these will only be my own entries in what is sure
to be a much larger debate within the profession. Thus, my look
to the future is intended only to frame, rather than resolve,
that debate.
Economists and industrial relations specialists should
approach such questions with great trepidation given their
demonstrated inability to predict the future at critical
junctures in the history of industrial relations. There are two
reasons why it is difficult to predict the future of collective
bargaining based on past trends. The first is that union growth
does not generally follow a smooth incremental path. Rather new
spurts in union growth tend to coincide with major shifts in (1)
the economic and political and social environment, (2) changes
in labor law or public policies, and (3) shifts in the
strategies of unions. The second is that periods of significant
turmoil or change often produce new sets of values, strategies,
and practices that then evolve into new, accepted institutional
arrangements. Since these are not simple incremental
modifications of prior practices, they are difficult to envision
or predict beforehand. Thus, economists in the early 1930s
failed to anticipate the growth in union membership that erupted
after passage of the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) and the
adoption of an industrial unionism strategy for organizing the
mass production manufacturing industries. Similarly, no
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industrial relations experts predicted the rise of public sector
unionism in the 1960s that coincided with the urban social
crises, the enactment of President Kennedy's Executive Order
10988 in 1962 followed by similar and stronger bargaining
legislation at the state level, and the transformation of
associations of public employees into full fledged collective
bargaining entities.
While the record of previous predictions should give solace
to those who disagree with what follows, it also would be
unrealistic to ignore the trends of the past decades and expect
a natural correction or resurgence of union membership and
collective bargaining to occur that will stimulate renewed
demand for labor arbitration in the same fashion as it evolved
in the New Deal system. Instead, to gain insight into the
future we need to first understand both the forces behind the
erosion of coverage of collective bargaining and union
membership and the pressures that are producing changes in the
instutitional structure and practice of collective bargaining
where it continues to exist.
For the past five years our research group has been
examining the changes in collective bargaining that have been
taking place and working toward the development of a stronger
theoretical framework capable of both understanding why these
changes are occurring and what they imply for the future of U.S.
industrial relations. What follows is a general summary of our
conclusions and an effort to explore their implications for the
future of labor arbitration.3
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A Fundamental Transformation of Industrial Relations
Our central conclusion is that the New Deal industrial
relations system is undergoing a fundamental transition or
transformation not only as a result of the changes in the
economic and political environment of the early 1980s, but also
in response to the gradual buildup since the 1960s of
environmental pressures and to changes in managerial
strategies. By a fundamental change we mean changes which alter
the roles or established patterns of behavior of labor and
management within and across three different tiers or levels of
industrial relations activity within the firm: (1) at the
workplace, (2) at the level of collective bargaining or
personnel policy making and administration, and (3) at the
highest level of strategic decision making within management and
labor organizations. Changes in established roles or patterns
of behavior within each of these levels of activity are altering
the basic principles and relationships that existed across these
levels and that fit together to gave the New Deal collective
bargaining system its coherence and logic. We believe that we
can best understand the dynamics of industrial relations
practice by examining the practices within and across these
levels. Thus, I will use this framework to review briefly the
evolution of the New Deal system and the recent developments
which challenge it.
The Evolution of the New Deal Model
The passage of the NLRA signified the choice of the middle
tier or level of our three tiered framework as the central forum
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for joining and resolving the interests of management and
labor. In return for preserving the rights of management to
make strategic business decisions workers and unions gained the
right to negotiate over the impacts of those decisions on wages,
hours, and other conditions of employment. At the workplace
management also retained the right to initiate action subject to
the rights of workers to file a grievance to enforce
management's obligation to adhere to the contract. Over time as
the provisions of bargaining agreements became more complex and
detailed, grievance procedures and binding arbitration became
tools for unions and employers to develop uniformity and
predictability in personnel administration. As well, they
provided workers a channel for voicing their individual claims
and problems on a day-to-day basis during the term of an
agreement.
This model worked well from the 1930s through the 1960s
because the principles and practices developed at each level of
the system were well suited to the economic environment and to
the strategic needs of management and labor. At the middle
level the collective bagaining process served to "take wages out
of competition" as unions organized large portions of domestic
product markets and standardized wages through a combination of
centralized bargaining structures and/or pattern bargaining. By
relying on a general wage policy that sought to tie wages to the
long-term rate of growth in productivity and increases in the
cost of living, unions were able to improve the relative wages
of their members and share in the benefits of an expanding
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domestic economy. The annual improvement factor fashioned by
the UAW was the clearest expression of the link between wages
and economic growth. Thus, union strategies that increased
wages through collective bargaining were compatible with their
environment as long as markets continued to expand and
productivity increased.
Achieving stability, predictability, and labor peace were
central to the business strategies of American employers seeking
to take advantage of these expanding market opportunities. At
the workplace, adoption of grievance procedures ending in
binding arbitration therefore served a crucial function in
guaranteeing stability and labor peace during the term of the
agreement. From management's perspective, the no strike
guarantee and grievance arbitration were intimately interwined.
These procedures likewise served the interests of workers and
unions by replacing the arbitrary and often inconsistent or
discriminatory practices of supervisors with more uniform and
equitable specification of individual rights and
responsibilities.
While the parties to thousands of different collective
bargaining relationships adapted this general model to meet
their specfic needs and modified it in incremental ways from the
1940s through the 1970s, these adaptations and adjustments did
not (with few exceptions) fundamentally alter or challenge the
underlying principles of the system. As such, these roles of
the parties at the workplace, collective bargaining, and the
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strategic levels of the system remained stable. Throughout this
period, management maintained its essential rights to make
strategic business decisions subject to their legal obligations
to negotiate over wages, hours, and working conditions. Unions
and companies continued to pursue wage policies that stressed
comparability and standardization in order to minimize wage
competition. The grievance procedure provided the means-for
adapting the terms of the agreement to changing conditions, to
resolve differences over interpretion without resort to strikes,
and to provide employees with a channel to question or challenge
the administration of the contract.
The Growth of a Nonunion Alternative Model
Collective bargaining served as the major innovative force
in industrial relations from the New Deal through at least the
1950s -- extending well beyond the unionized sector by what was
termed the "shock effect." However, by the early 1960s a new
nonunion model was beginning to emerge. Over the course of the
next two decades, this model would grow and diffuse to the point
that, by the 1980s, it would pose a major challenge to the New
Deal collective bargaining system. This model emerged first in
the newer growth industries among white collar and professional
employees, but then spread to capture a high proportion of the
new jobs created in sectors and occupations that had been highly
unionized in previous years. While this model evolved slowly
and was modified through trial an error over the course of the
1960s and 1970s, its key features involved: (1) payment of wages
that were competitive in the local labor market but lower than
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the standard union rate in the industry, (2) greater flexibility
in the organization of work than is the case in typical labor
agreements, (3) greater emphasis on individual and small group
participation and communications, and (4) a stronger role for
human resource management professionals at the strategic level
of decision-making to both implement this new system and to take
a proactive role in avoiding unionization. Interestingly, some
of these non-union firms developed extensive dispute resolution
systems, some of which even featured grievance arbitration.
This approach was highly successful in stopping the growth
in unionization among firms intent on doing so. For example,
using data from a Conference Board survey, we found that unions
organized only about 15 percent of new plants opened between
1975 and 1983 by firms that had at least some or all of their
production employees unionized at the beginning of this
period .4 Furthermore, the risk of being unionized was
reduced to less than one percent among firms that implemented
the features of this model. As a result we estimated that the
decline in union membership was twice as large in firms that
adopted these policies compared to those that did not.
Coinciding with the effects of these changing management
strategies have been (and continue to be) structural shifts in
the economy that further erode the base of unionism. Although
it is difficult to provide an exact estimate of the separate or
independent effects of structural (industry, occupational,
regional, and demographic) change, recent estimates suggest they
account for between 40 and 60 percent of the decline in
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unionization since the 1950s.
The culmination these trends results in a situation in which
unions are now located primarily in the oldest industries, the
oldest firms competing in partially unionized industries, and
the oldest facilities of partially unionized firms. Moreover,
because collective bargaining continued in the 1970s to follow
the patterns and wage formulas established in earlier years
while the nonunion sector was growing, the union/nonunion wage
differential widened, it expanded from an average of between 10
to 15 percent in the 1960s to an average of more than 20 percent
in the 1970s.6 These differentials were even larger for
fringe benefits and for entry level wage rates.7 Thus, the
aggregate figures on private sector unionization mask the more
serious situation implied by the recent trends and current
distribution of union membership. Looking to the future, we
expect union membership to continue for some time to come to be
highly sensitive to both structural shifts in the economy and
organizational restructuring and redeployment of investment
dollars.
Union-Management Responses in the 1980s
While the expansion of the nonunion sector occurred
gradually over the course of the 1960 to 1980 time period, it
was not until the pressures of nonunion competition interacted
with the deep recession of 1981-82 and the changes in the
political environment of the 1980s that significant changes
occurred in collective bargaining, at the workplace, and at the
strategic levels of industrial relations activity in unionized
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firms. Since these changes have been widely discussed
elsewhere, in reviewing them here I will focus on the changes
most important for consequences for the arbitration process.8
The most visible changes have occurred in the process and
results of collective bargaining. It was the visible departures
in both the process and the results of bargaining that began to
appear in 1981 and gained momentum in 1982 that made the term
"concession bargaining" part of our industrial relations
vocabulary. These changes sparked a vigorous debate over whether
these departures from the pre-1980 trends were merely temporary
deviations or represented a more lasting structural shift in
wage determination under collective bargaining.9 Our position
in this debate is that a structural shift did in fact occur and
that it is most pronounced and will have its longest lasting
effects in those bargaining relationships where both the
environment and the institutional structure and process of
negotiations have changed so that unions can no longer "take
wages out of competition." The most significant changes in the
structure and process of bargaining include: (1)
decentralization of bargaining structures in a number industries
such as coal, steel, and trucking; (2) increased variability in
wage settlements across firms that had previously been tied
together by intra-industry or intra-region pattern bargaining,
(3) reduced influence and control over negotiations by
industrial relations professionals within management and
increased influence of line managers and top executives, (4)
more use of direct communications from management to rank and
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file workers, and (5) a reduction in the frequency and the
economic returns to strikes.1 0
These changes in the structure and process of negotiations
in turn produced a structural shift in the underlying model of
wage determination. We can summarize the changes in the results
of bargaining as follows: (1) the rate of wage growth under
collective bargaining was reduced by between one to three
percentage points per year below what it would have been had the
settlement patterns of the 1960-80 time period continued, (2)
the biggest departures from the pre-1980 period ocurred in those
relationships in which bargaining was most centralized and where
pattern bargaining was most prevalent, and (3) major changes in
work rules were demanded by management to increase flexibility
and lower costs.11 These changes are most likely to persist
over time where the rise of nonunion competition from either
domestic or international sources make it difficult or
impossible for collective bargaining to take wages out of
competition.
Along with these visible changes in collective bargaining
came intensified efforts at the workplace level of industrial
relations to improve productivity and product quality through
greater employee participation and incremental efforts to modify
work rules in ways that increase managerial flexibility in the
utilization of the workforce. Although many union leaders
remain skeptical about the managerial motives underlying the
quality of work (QWL) movement, employee participation processes
expanded in number and in scope in many union-management
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relationships. Not all of these, however, have survived or
continued to diffuse to include larger numbers of workers in the
bargaining unit and/or the overall organization. Our
conclusion, based on studies of a number of these processes,1 2
is that the ones that are most likely to survive over time and
make the most significant contribution to improving economic
performance and employment security are ones in which (1) the
participation process goes beyond narrow QWL or quality circle
(QC) programs to address work rule and work organization issues
that are signficant barriers to improving productivity and
quality, (2) and where cooperative efforts at the workplace are
supported by policies and actions at the collective bargaining
and strategic levels of decision making which reinforce and
support the trust these processes require.
The changes introduced by the most effective workplace
experiments are especially important to understand for the
future of arbitration since they directly challenge the
centrality of the grievance procedure as the forum for worker
voice and problem solving. Most of these processes start out
with language stating that they will be separate from collective
bargaining, will not in any way change provisions or practices
governed by the bargaining agreement, and will not interfere
with the functioniong of the grievance procedure. Yet we have
consistently found that, over time, the most successful examples
of workplace participation have expanded in scope to make
changes in work organization and work rules that are covered in
bargaining agreements and have introduced new means of solving
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problems or conflicts that heretofore could only have been
channeled through the established grievance procedure.
Moreover, one of the positive effects of a successful QWL
processes is an improvement in the relationships among workers,
supervisors, and managers. This often translates into a
reduction in grievance rates. Finally, in its most advanced
forms, as most clearly illustrated in the new Saturn agreement
between General Motors and the United Automobile Workers,
workplace reform can lead to a radical simplicfication in work
rules and contractual provisions and a commitment by the parties
to encourage consensus decision making rather than rely on
standard rules and enforcement procedures. While grievance
procedures and binding arbitration are not eliminated in these
new systems, the concern for flexibility and problem solving
reduce the centrality of the grievance procedure and establish
alternative forums and procedures for some of their traditional
functions.13
Changes at the strategic level of decision-making are
perhaps more limited -- occuring primarily in bargaining
relationships facing extreme economic pressures. Yet, where they
have occurred, they represent equally fundamental departures
from the principles and practices of the New Deal collective
bargaining system. The common feature of changes at the
strategic level is that industrial relations and human resource
management considerations are now playing a more important role
in strategic business decision making. In nonunion or in union
settings where unions are not powerful enough to influence the
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success or failure of business strategy decisions, line managers
and human resource executives are central participants in
decisions over issues such as investments, plant location, new
technology, production sourcing or service contracting.
However, in situations where unions can have a significant
effect on the outcomes of these decisions or where unions
perceive a major stake in these issues and are able to extract
quid pro quos for cooperation at the workplace or in collective
bargaining, union leaders are beginning to play a more active
role at the strategic level of the firm.
These new roles vary considerably in the nature and degree
of participation. Many go only as far as information sharing
and consultation. In extreme crisis situations (most notably in
airlines and trucking and in selected steel companies) more
formal involvement is achieved through membership on boards of
directors and employee stock ownership plan. Less visible, but
increasingly common, are the negotiation of strategic bargains
in which changes in traditional work rules or compensation
arrangements are traded off for commitments to new investments
in plant-or equipment. Finally, a few unions and firms have
begun to engage in joint strategic planning for new investments
and the design of work systems in new or retrofitted
facilities. The involvement of the UAW in the planning of the
Saturn organization illustrates this approach. Since these
developments require breaking from the managerial premise that
it is soley "managements' job to manage" and from the business
unionism principle that unions should avoid participating in
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managerial decisions for fear of being coopted or losing touch
with their rank and file, they represent another example of the
fundamental changes in collective bargaining and industrial
relations that labor and management have been experimenting with
over the first half of this decade.
The overriding conclusion from our research on the changes
that have been taking place in industrial relations within
unionized relationships is that it will be extremely difficult
to return to the principles and practices that lent stability to
the New Deal system in the pre 1980s. The increased exposure to
global and domestic competition, the changing nature of
technology in the office and the factory, the increased priority
firms must give to flexibility in the use of human resources and
to cooperation at the workplace to achieve this flexibility will
all continue to induce changes in labor-management relations.
These changes will include mininimizing labor costs and linking
cost increases to their specific economic conditions, pressing
for greater flexibility and higher commitment and cooperation
from their employees, and better integrating human resource
strategies to their underlying business strategies. Further,
these changes will be interactive. In this context, nonunion
firms and firms with only a minority of their blue collar
workers organized will either maintain or intensify their union
avoidance efforts. On the other hand, more highly unionized
firms that cannot achieve these changes through union avoidance
will need to accept a broader union role at the strategic and
the workplace levels in order to gain union and rank and file
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commitment to the human resource management and organizational
principles needed to be competitive in today's world. Yet this
will involve a narrower role for grievance arbitration.
Finally, those firms and unions that try to return to the wage,
workplace, and strategic level practices of the pre 1980s in
settings where they are not protected from domestic or
international competition will simply experience continued
shrinkage in profitability and employment. In these sites
arbitration will, of course, continue its present form. But, as
I detail later, the issues will become narrowerer and the tone
more acrimonious.
Recent Trends in Arbitration Caseloads
In his recent paper presented to the mid year meetings of
the National Academy of Arbitrators Jack Stieber noted that
despite the decline in the percentage of the labor force that is
unionized, the absolute number of labor arbitration cases filed
with the American Arbitration Association (AAA) and the Federal
Mediation and Conciliation Service (FMCS) has declined only
slightly between 1978 and 1984.14 Data provided from both
the FMCS and the Detroit region of the AAA further suggest that
private sector cases are declining both as a proportion of the
total cases as well as in absolute numbers while the number of
public sector cases has been increasing. A slightly different
pattern in case loads has been experienced in the Boston
regional office of the AAA. Again, total labor case have
declined only slightly between 1981 and 1985. However, while
the number of private sector cases have basically held constant,
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public sector cases fell off approximately twenty to thirty
percent in the wake of the tax limitations imposed in 1981 on
local governments in Massachusetts.1 5 While the public sector
trends in Massachusetts may be unique circumstances of the state
tax limitation (or they may provide a prediction of the effects
of Gramm-Rudman budget restrictions on future caseloads in the
federal sector), the relative stability of private sector cases
again demonstrate that no large fall-off in caseload has yet
been experienced.
Professor Stieber provides further interesting data on
arbitration cases at U.S. Steel and Bethlehem Steel that show
despite similar employment declines of approximately 70 percent
between 1969 and 1985, the number of grievance arbitration cases
has held constant at U.S. Steel compared to a 43 percent
decline in the number of cases at Bethlehem Steel. Apparently,
the difference in the experience of these two company continues
today with U.S. Steel reporting a backlog of approximately 1,250
arbitration cases.1 6 The difference in the experience of
these two companies illustrates two important points to which I
will return to later in this paper. First, declines in
unionized employment do not translate into immediate declines in
the number of arbitration cases in situations where relations
are highly adversarial. This has been and continues to be the
case in the relationship between U.S Steel and the United
Steelworkers of America (USW). Second, those cases that go to
arbitration in these types of bargaining relationships are
likely to be small tactical battles in a much larger strategic
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conflict over which arbitrators and the arbitration process are
likely to have little influence. That is, the cases will be
important for the individual grievants but are unlikely to alter
the long term evolution of the bargaining relationship. Indeed,
the experience of U.S. Steel and the USW may be an example of
the future of grievance arbitration in bargaining relationships
that experience employment declines in adversarial setting.
Data from several case studies of workplace innovations we
currently have underway illustrate how both the frequency of use
and the role of grievance procedures change over time in
settings where workplace innovations are in place. While the
case data suggest that the number of grievances and arbitration
cases generally decline, the magnitude and stability of the
decline depend on whether or not management and labor
representatives change their collective bargaining processes
and outcomes and their stategic interactions in ways that
reinforce the climate of trust and cooperation emanating from
the workplace. The role of the grievance procedure also becomes
more circumscribed as the parties experiment with a wider
variety of forums for solving workplace problems and reduce
their tactical use of the grievance procedure to solve their
political problems.
The general conclusions that can be drawn from these limited
data on arbitration cases are that (1) there has been a slight
decline in the number of private sector arbitration cases filed
and decided in recent years, however, the decline in cases is
less than proportional to the decline in the number of private
sector union members, (2) the more adversarial the bargaining
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relationship, the less the number of arbitration cases declines
in response to union membership declines, and (3) the drop in
private sector cases has been partially made up by a rise in
public sector cases. Furthermore, where workplace innovations
have been successful, grievances rates have fallen. While more
comprehensive and dissaggregated data are needed before any firm
conclusions can be reached, the bottom line based on these data
seems to be that the overall demand for grievance arbitration
has declined only slightly in recent years.
Implications for the Future Role of Arbitration
These case statistics and our research suggest that the
future of grievance arbitration will depend heavily on both the
future scope and nature of the collective bargaining process and
on how the arbitration profession chooses to adapt to these
changes. As well, the future of arbitration depends on which of
a number of possible scenarios dominate the future of collective
bargaining. Several possible scenarios are outlined in the
final chapter of our forthcoming book. Two will be discussed
below in order to suggest how the future of collective
bargaining will affect the role of arbitration. The first
scenario assumes a continuation in the decline of union
membership accompanied by an increase in the intensity of union
management conflict in those settings where unions perceive
serious threats to their organizational security and/or
survival. The second assumes continued diffusion of the types
of innovations in labor management relations discussed in this
paper and a gradual movement toward their institutionalization
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as ongoing features of our industrial relations system. While
we recognize that both of these scenarios may occur in different
bargaining relationships, the future of arbitration will be most
affected by which scenario dominates.
If scenario one dominates--that is, union membership and the
number of collective bargaining relationships continue their
long term decline, we can expect a slow, gradual, but
considerably lagged decline in the demand for arbitration. To
the extent that the decline in unionization coincides, as we
anticipate, with an intensification of conflict and
adversarialism, the lag in the falloff in the demand for
arbitration will be longer. However, the importance and the
contribution of arbitration to the bargaining relationships will
diminish as the central issues and conflicts that will decide
the eventual fate of the employment relationship are decided
either in negotiations or by higher level strategic decisions of
the parties. While the tactical battles of the parties may keep
some arbitrators busy, their roles will be akin to rearranging
the chairs on the deck of the Titanic. To stabilize the ship
much less enhance its ability to navigate through stormy seas
would require fundamental shifts in the strategic direction of
the parties. Arbitration was never designed nor is it capable
of performing this function.
It should be noted, however, that scenario one does not
predict a continual decline in unionism below 10 percent.1 7
Thus, the decline in the number of grievance cases should
likewise not exceed more than forty percent. Most likely the
-20-
decline would be considerably less given the increases in
conflict expected under this scenario. But while their
caseloads may hold up, experienced arbitrators are likely to
become increasing frustrated and discouraged with their roles as
they see their impact on the parties and on the bargaining
relationship continue to diminish. The frustration level is
likely to be highest among arbitrators most committed to
clinical or problem-solving style and to the relationship
building functions of the arbitration process.
If, however, the alternative scenario gains momentum and the
pace of innovations in collective bargaining expands and union
membership either stabilizes or grows, the potential base for
arbitration will likewise be stabilized or expanded. However,
if this happens arbitration is not predestined to play as
central a role in collective bargaining in the future as it did
in the past. Instead the needs of the parties for flexibility
and adaptability will most likely produce a varied set of
processes for solving problems and resolving differences or
conflicts at the workplace.1 8 One can easily envision and
predict an expansion in the demand for equally flexible third
parties with multiple skills in problem solving, negotiations,
mediation, strategic planning, and arbitration. Under this
scenario, the eventual demand for arbitrators will depend on
whether current and future members of the arbitration profession
define their roles broadly enough to fill these multiple roles
or leave the non-arbitration roles to the growing number of
consultants and third parties trained in alternative dispute
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resolution (ADR) methods. The competition for these newly
emerging roles is likely to be intense given the burgeoning
supply of ADR enthusiasts, QWL facilitators, and consultants.
Regardless of who fills these roles, the skills required and the
values implicit in them sound remarkably consistent with the
conception of dispute resolution favored by permanent umpires
such as the late George Taylor and others who mixed mediation
and arbitration as it seemed appropriate to the problem at
hand.1 9
Finally, although a serious analysis of their prospects and
implications lie beyond the scope of this paper, one can
envision a variety of legislative and/or private developments
which might expand the demand for arbitrator services beyond the
traditional grievance arbitration arena. For example,
legislation extending bargaining rights to public employees in
the southern and western states that have not enacted such laws
would very likely increase the demand for grievance arbitration
and perhaps for interest arbitrators as well. Enactment of
federal or state legislation requiring just cause prior to
dismissal that incorporated a role for private arbitration as an
alternative to adjudication of claims through a public agency or
the courts would likewise provide a substantial increase in the
demand for arbitration services. Enactment of labor law reform
with a provision for binding arbitration of first contracts
would similarly provide at least marginal growth in the demand
for interest arbitration.
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Summary
The central message of our analysis is that if present
trends in collective bargaining and union membership continue we
will continue to see a slow erosion in the demand for
arbitration, and a decline in its centrality and contribution to
the performance of our industrial relations system. If the
current innovative experiments expand, the base of collective
bargaining may broaden but the demand for traditional forms of
grievance aribtration will not expand as rapidly as will the
demand for alternative problem solving, planning, and conflict
resolution services. If the current and future generations of
arbitrators are to match the contributions of their predecessors
who established and built the profession, it is clear they will
need to broaden and adapt their skills in ways that meet the
contemporary needs of the parties. Those who adapt in this way
will not only fulfill the legacy left to them by the giants of
the past but will serve the industrial relations system in a way
similar to the earlier generation by helping the parties to
collective bargaining steer their way through this historic but
exceedingly dangerous and uncertain transition.
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